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“Gate of the Sun”: Applying Human Rights Law 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territories in Light of 
Non-Violent Resistance and Normalization 
By Keren Greenblatt* 
This paper is dedicated to the people of Palestine and the non-violent movement to 
fight the occupation, in the hope of a better future. 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
¶1  On January 11th 2013, approximately twenty tents and several service structures 
were erected by Palestinian activists in an area in East Jerusalem, known as “E-1” or A-
Tur.1 Later, several other tents and structures were added, and close to two hundred 
activists were residing in the area.2 On the same day, the Israeli Supreme Court issued a 
temporary injunction to prevent the eviction and destruction of tents that were built on the 
land of A-Tur unless there was an urgent security necessity. The petitioners argued before 
the court that  the site was a tourist venture for the teaching of the Bedouin heritage. The 
respondents argued that this was a defiant action meant to create provocation, 
disturbances to public order, and riots.3 The activists released the following statement to 
the public:  
¶2  We, the sons and daughters of Palestine from all throughout the land, announce the 
establishment of Bab Alshams Village (Gate of the Sun). We the people, without permits 
from the occupation, without permission from anyone, sit here today because this is our 
land and it is our right to inhabit it . . . Bab Alshmas is the gate to our freedom and 
steadfastness. Bab Alshams is our gate to Jerusalem. Bab Alshams is the gate to our 
return . . . This action . . . is a form of popular resistance. In the coming days we will hold 
various discussion groups, educational and artistic presentations, as well as film 
screenings on the lands of this village.4 
¶3  The next day, the area was declared a closed military zone, and later, Israeli 
security forces evicted activists from the tent village. Israeli forces submitted a statement 
to the court declaring that this action fell within the urgent security necessity exception to 
the injunction. More activists attempted to join the village and refused to comply with the 
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security force’s instructions to leave the area. Subsequently, rioting developed and 
around twenty activists were arrested.5 The court is still waiting to hold a hearing on the 
property claims over this stretch of land, and the Palestinians’ right to establish a village 
on it. Meanwhile, activists continue to put up new tents each time the military forces 
confiscate them.6 
¶4  Bab Alshams is one of the most recent examples of the intensifying non-violent 
Palestinian resistance movement. Some other examples are the weekly marches against 
the security barrier (hereinafter “the Wall”) that take place in villages where the barrier 
cuts people from their lands and prevents them from reaching school and work,7 the 
proliferation of Palestinian films and art against the occupation,8 and the mostly 
successful struggle toward statehood in the international arena.9  It is the premise of this 
paper that these phenomena require a new inquiry into the balance between the law of 
belligerent occupation within the framework of the international humanitarian law 
(hereinafter “IHL”) and international human rights law.  
¶5  In this paper I argue that the prolonged duration of the Israeli occupation of the 
Palestinian territories (hereinafter “OPT”), combined with the intensifying non-violent 
resistance, justifies a stronger human rights law approach, rather than an IHL approach, 
in the administration of the Palestinian population and lands.  
¶6  International humanitarian law and human rights law are complementary systems, 
both of which aim to protect the lives, dignity, and health of human beings. Humanitarian 
law is designed to apply in times of emergency (particularly in times of armed conflict).  
Human rights law always applies.10 For this reason, there are certain human rights from 
which governments are permitted to derogate during times of emergency, under a specific 
structure of conditions. However, none of the provisions of humanitarian law can be 
suspended in emergency, since it only applies in those times.11 Humanitarian law focuses 
on military actions; human rights law focuses on the obligations of governments toward 
individuals in their jurisdictions. Further differences between these two systems will be 
explained throughout this paper, with particular emphasis on the concrete implications of 
shifting from a humanitarian law paradigm to a human rights paradigm with regard to the 
situation in Palestine. 
¶7  There are many implications to the theoretical implementation of such a paradigm 
shift. These may include the de-legitimization of the Israeli government’s use of security 
as justification for human rights violations, further protection of Palestinian property 
(including lands and homes), the cessation of settlement activity as a form of 
dispossession and discrimination, further protection of Palestinians’ right to health, 
education, freedom of movement, among others, and perhaps a new approach to the 
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human right of self-determination, eventually leading to the end of the occupation 
altogether.  
¶8  In the first section of this paper, I review the origins and fundamentals of the 
international law of belligerent occupation and its relation to international human rights 
law. In the second section, I provide a brief background of the Israeli occupation of the 
OPT, particularly of the West Bank. In the third section, I review the different approaches 
to what the applicable legal framework in this situation ought to be, including the Israeli 
and Palestinian approaches and those of the international community. In the fourth 
section, I discuss the different approaches and argue that, currently, the most persuasive 
applicable legal framework is a strong human rights law approach, with a few general 
norms borrowed from the law of armed conflict. In the final section, I analyze the case of 
Bab Alshams in light of this proposed approach and show how this approach would have 
produced radically different outcomes.  
II.   FROM CONQUEST TO TRUST  
A.   The development of the law of belligerent occupation 
¶9  The law of belligerent occupation governs the relationship between an occupying 
power and the inhabitants of an occupied state. According to traditional sources, the law 
is applicable in situations of international armed conflict. It is important to review the 
evolution of the law of occupation as a basis for later understanding the Israeli conduct in 
the OPT.  
¶10  The first authority to codify norms addressing occupation was the Lieber Code,12 
commissioned by President Lincoln during the Civil War. This code clearly prioritized 
military needs over humanitarian considerations.13 The first international attempt to 
codify the law of occupation was the Brussels Declaration of 1874,14 which offered a 
definition of occupation that survived into the later, better-known projects: the Hague 
Conventions and Regulations of 1907.15 The definition of occupation in the Brussels 
Declaration was “a territory actually placed under the authority of a hostile army bounded 
by the territories around which it could establish and exercise authority.”16 The Hague 
Conventions provided a detailed enumeration of customary international humanitarian 
law,17 and they have reached the level of customary law themselves.18 Article 42 of the 
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Hague Regulations repeated almost precisely the Brussels definition of occupation.19 
These instruments provided for the protection of civilians living under occupation, who 
are entitled at all times to respect for their persons, honor, family rights, religious 
conviction and customs, and should also enjoy protection of their private property.20 
Collective punishment is forbidden,21 and several other rights and duties are prescribed. 
The notion of actual authority or control by the occupying military over the occupied 
population was expressed by the obligation to restore and ensure public order and safety 
while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws of the occupied territory.22 This 
obligation has been interpreted by occupying powers and the international community as 
the ability to issue and enforce directives to the inhabitants of the territory.23  
¶11  In 1949, the Fourth Geneva Convention24 codified these rules once again, with 
several additional norms learnt from World War II.25 Common Article 2 expanded the 
scope of the laws of occupation to include situations of conflict that lack an official 
declaration of war and armed resistance by the occupied population.26 The substantive 
provisions of the Convention further advanced the protections of the individual rights of 
the occupied population.  
¶12  Article 75 of the Geneva Convention’s Additional Protocol I provided a minimum 
standard of fundamental rights to be enjoyed by “persons who are in the power of a Party 
to the conflict and who do not benefit from more favourable treatment under the 
Conventions or under this Protocol.”27  
¶13  Because these norms have developed in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, and within the context of the law of armed conflict, there is no doubt that 
significant elements of this legal framework are anachronistic and require continuous 
revisiting as the nature of armed conflicts around the world changes.  
¶14  Today, the widely accepted28 definition of the phenomenon of occupation is the 
following:  
The exceptional exercise of public power by one state in a foreign territory 
and over its inhabitants . . . the effective control of a power (be it one or 
more states or an international organization, such as the United Nations) 
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 Judgment of the Nuremburg International Military Tribunal (30 Sept. 1946), 22 Trial of the Major War 
Criminals Before the Int’l Military Tribunal: Nuremburg, 14 November 1945 – 1 October 1946 411, 497 
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over a territory to which that power has no sovereign title, without the 
volition of the sovereign of that territory.29  
¶15  This definition, though not accepted by Israel, proves useful as it includes the many 
different existing kinds of occupations30 and allows for a substantive analysis of the 
conduct of the occupying powers, without having to struggle with how each situation, 
unique as it is, qualifies as an occupation. Nevertheless, this paper will examine the 
different approaches to the question of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories, 
including the convoluted position that Israel has taken, which in some ways rejects the 
notion of the existence of an occupation.31  
¶16  The contemporary, inclusive definition revolves around the most fundamental pillar 
of the law of occupation: occupation does not accord the occupant title to the territory. In 
other words, it temporarily severs the link between sovereignty and effective control.32 
The temporal element of occupation, although not explicitly included in this definition, is 
clearly understood from the constitutive texts of the law of occupation,33 its historical 
development, and the notion of the inalienability of sovereignty.34 In accordance with the 
temporal element, the occupant serves as a trustee of the sovereign for the duration of the 
occupation, in a manner that protects civil life.35 Although not codified in an international 
instrument, this contemporary definition more closely corresponds with current 
interpretations of situations of occupation and the legal framework applicable to them.36 
Accordingly, it also serves recent developments in the theory of the law of occupation, 
which infuse international human rights law into the application of the law of armed 
conflict in different ways. These developments will be discussed in section I(b). 
¶17  Some of the fundamental purposes of the law of occupation include: 1) ensuring 
that civilians under the control of an occupying power are treated humanely; 2) 
harmonizing these humanitarian interests with the military needs of the occupying power; 
3) preventing the occupying power from imposing drastic and permanent changes in the 
occupied territory’s political, economic, social and legal orders; and 4) facilitating the 
prospects for a future peace agreement, which will determine the permanent status of the 
territory.37 As this body of law developed, along with a parallel general shift in 
international law from a sovereignty-focused system to an individual rights-focused 
system, the emphasis on the military needs of the occupying power has gradually 
diminished.38 In the background of the changes put into the Geneva Convention, as 
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compared to the Hague Conventions, was the protection of the occupied civilians, rather 
than facilitation of the occupant’s interests.39 This, however, does not mean that there has 
been a total de-legitimization of military or security needs. It is instead a question of 
balance between those needs and the rights of the protected persons.  
¶18  For obvious reasons, certain occupying powers such as Israel have a vested interest 
in taking a traditional and conservative approach to the applicable legal system to their 
occupation. The more progressive the approach, the more the weight of the balance shifts 
towards the protection of individuals. But it is not only a question of progressive versus 
traditional worldviews—it is also a matter of legitimacy, international relations, policy, 
and politics. The next section addresses the relationship between the law of armed 
conflict and human rights law in the arena of occupation, in order to lay the groundwork 
for the argument of why human rights law ought to prevail as the primary applicable 
legal regime for the OTP.  
B.   Strange bedfellows: the relationship between the laws of armed conflict and human 
rights 
¶19  Recent developments in the theory, and perhaps the practice of the law of 
occupation, introduce international human rights law into the application of humanitarian 
law through several approaches. One approach views human rights law as the general 
legal background that protects individuals at all times, whereas IHL is applied in a 
situation of occupation as lex specialis.40 According to this approach, human rights law 
will be called upon in cases of lacunae in the law of occupation, or for interpretational 
purposes.41 Another approach views human rights law as complementary to IHL in a 
more harmonious, coexistent manner.42 This approach suggests that there is no need to 
“choose” the lex specialis over human rights law, but rather to look for the consistent, 
harmonious application of the two systems.43 The Human Rights Committee even 
suggested reversing the order and using humanitarian law to interpret human rights 
provisions.44 In any case it is already well established that human rights obligations 
prevail in some form in circumstances of belligerent occupation.45 
¶20  One concern of applying human rights law to occupation is the underlying 
requirement of sovereignty for the application of human rights obligations. The 
extraterritorial applicability of human rights law remains a highly contentious debate.46 
Nevertheless, and perhaps surprisingly so, it seems that there is much less controversy 
when it comes to military occupation situations. Several international bodies, including 
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the International Court of Justice (ICJ)47 have confirmed the assertion that the Occupying 
Power must abide by human rights obligations as the administrator of the territory and its 
inhabitants.48    
¶21  Another question relevant to this complex relationship is whether most of the 
human rights obligations that states or tribunals would find applicable in a situation of 
occupation, considering that some obligations cannot be applied due to the constraints of 
the situation and stronger IHL norms, do not already exist under the rules of IHL. One 
answer to this question is simply “no.” Many of the rights enumerated in the ICESCR as 
well as some civil and political rights such as the freedom of assembly, for example, are 
not adequately covered by traditional IHL. Furthermore, applying human rights law adds 
more than additional rights and freedoms; in general, it adds a different approach to how 
a controlling power can derogate from those particular rights. This approach is much 
stricter on the government and its interests and needs, and it adds, in particular, the 
possibility of recourse from international human rights mechanisms,49 at the very least in 
territories that are part of strong regional human rights justice systems such as the EU or 
the OAS.   
¶22  These questions are not simply theoretical or academic in nature. In a series of 
cases brought before European tribunals, for example, the applicability of human rights 
instruments came into question in situations of armed conflict and different types of 
occupations. In a case brought before the U.K. courts concerning the killing of six Iraqi 
civilians by British soldiers, the U.K. government contended that there is a difference 
between being an occupying power for the purposes of the Hague Regulations and 
Geneva IV, and having effective control for the purposes of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.50 The court rejected this contention and determined that the UK was 
obliged to apply the ECHR as an occupying power in Iraq.51  
¶23  In the Issa case, where the court could not find as a matter of fact that the 
petitioners were under the effective control of the Turkish forces, the European Court still 
found as a matter of principle that even in a situation that is something less than a full 
fledged occupation, a state could be held accountable for violations of treaty 
obligations.52 This particular case shows that although the petitioners were not able to 
meet the required evidentiary standards, the court did not avoid the contentious issue, but 
rather made a strong statement with relative ease as to the clear applicability of human 
rights obligations in a situation of “effective control.”53   
¶24  The Human Rights Committee, in interpreting the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), also made the same contention—that the Parties to the 
Covenant are required by article 2(1) to ensure the Covenant rights to all persons within 
their territory, and to all persons subject to their jurisdiction. This means that a party must 
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ensure the rights in the Covenant to anyone within its power or effective control, even if 
not situated within the territory of that state.54  
¶25  Although there are different paths to reach the same conclusion, and although there 
is now a presumption of a general applicability of human rights law, there is still a need 
to understand the specific context of an occupation to determine how much and which 
parts of human rights law are applied.55 In other words, what are the substantive human 
rights obligations that apply to a specific situation?  
¶26  It is implausible to require occupying states to uphold all of the rights enumerated 
in those instruments the state is bound by. This is not even possible in a normal, 
peacetime, domestic situation. Any state is constantly faced with the task of balancing 
conflicting rights and freedoms in order to maintain public order. However, the literature 
suggests that those rights that are de facto under the control of an occupying power 
should be observed56 equally to the rights of a citizen of that state.57 One factor for the 
determination of the substantive rights to be upheld in a specific situation is whether the 
removed or occupied sovereign has some areas of authority that have remained under its 
control.58 Such is the case with the Palestinian Authority as agreed in the Oslo Accords, 
and will be discussed in the following section.  
¶27  The Gaza Strip is a separate yet fascinating case study for this issue, because 
although Israel had unilaterally pulled out all of its military forces from the area, and 
Hamas had gained effective administrative control over the population,59 the Israel 
Defense Forces (hereinafter “IDF”) maintain control over the airspace, maritime, and 
land borders of the strip. In that context, Israel imposes blockades that in many cases 
prevent food and medical supplies from moving in and out of Gaza, as well as the 
movement of people from Gaza to the West Bank, thus seriously violating certain 
fundamental human rights.  
¶28  Another factor concerns certain obligations imposed on the occupying power by 
IHL, such as the prohibition on introducing new penal legislation unless it is absolutely 
essential for the fulfillment of the occupant’s obligations under the Convention, to 
maintain the orderly government of the territory, and to ensure the security of the 
Occupying Power.60 A functioning and up-to-date criminal law system is indispensable to 
the full realization of many of the rights in the main human rights instruments, such as 
the rights to life, security of person, effective remedy, and equal protection of the law,61 
to name a few.62  
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¶29  Arguably, IHL provides sufficient leeway for the protection of such rights through 
the “absolutely essential” exception carved out in article 64 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention63 or the duty to take all measures in the occupant’s power to ensure, as far as 
possible, public order and safety in the occupied territory as provided in the Hague 
Regulations.64 However, the notions of “absolutely essential” and “as far as possible” 
allow the occupying power to do the minimum amount of development needed in the 
occupied criminal system, and at the same time avoid taking measures that might 
improve the effectiveness, efficiency and scope of the rule of law in the occupied 
territory. As explained, one of the occupant’s primary obligations is to leave the occupied 
legal system untouched, as it was at the moment of occupation. This provides the 
occupant with the ability to easily evade its responsibilities toward the wellbeing of the 
occupied population, relying on the occupant’s compliance with international law. For 
this reason, among others, scholars have begun questioning whether IHL is a sufficient 
and just legal framework, particularly in situations of prolonged occupation.65 
¶30  Despite the positive developments toward human rights protection, both 
contemporary IHL and human rights law rightfully acknowledge the security needs of the 
state as a legitimate interest. For example, the Geneva Convention addresses “the 
imperative necessities of security of the State”66 and the ICCPR and ICESCR allow for 
certain rights to be derogated in a proclaimed state of emergency,67 and restrictions on 
rights to be applied for the legitimate aim of protecting national security.68  
¶31   Nevertheless, human rights law offers a specific, structured methodology with 
which to scrutinize any violation or restriction that the occupant justifies with national 
security needs. Specifically, where restrictions on human rights take place, the state must 
meet tests of necessity, proportionality, and legitimate aims;69 a prescription by law; 70 
and non-discrimination.71  
¶32  As will be discussed in section IV, this scrutiny is one of the compelling reasons 
for the more dominant application of human rights law in place of the more militarily 
inclined IHL. Furthermore, a prevalent notion in the interpretive literature is that the 
occupant cannot use its IHL obligations as justification for denying the applicability of 
human rights obligations.72 This seems to be a more progressive step in the interpretation 
of the relationship between IHL and human rights law in situations of occupation. 
Nevertheless, it has a strong basis in the human rights instruments themselves, and it does 
not follow from this assertion that the human rights obligations trump IHL in all 
circumstances. Instead, this argument focuses on negating the attempts to evade the 
general applicability of human rights law, despite the legitimacy of particular situations 
where the occupant could not meet its human rights obligations due to the 
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circumstances.73 Accordingly, IHL provisions such as article 43 of the Hague Regulations 
must not be used to allow occupants to avoid accountability when they choose not to take 
action to ensure public order and safety74 when needed.75 
¶33  The next level of this argument is the differentiation between the negative and 
positive aspects of human rights obligations. Negative obligations such as refraining from 
arbitrary killings, arrests, and detentions are applicable at all times. The positive 
obligations, such as providing or ensuring an effective law enforcement system, are 
dependent on the context of the conflict.76 Subsequently, situations of prolonged 
occupation may require active intervention in order to prevent stagnation in the 
economic, social and legal arenas. Thus, the duration and level of normalization of the 
occupation are an imperative contextual factor to be considered.77  
¶34  In order to fully understand how these different approaches may affect the 
applicable legal frameworks to the OPT, the next section provides a brief overview of the 
historical and legal background which led to the unimaginably complex situation in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
III. THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN TALE 
¶35  The basic, traditional legal framework to be applied in situations of occupation is 
humanitarian law, and recent developments have introduced human rights law into the 
equation, creating a complex and intertwined relationship between these two bodies of 
law. Israel contends that neither of these systems applies to the Palestinian territories. In 
fact, in some cases, Israeli officials have denied the actual existence of a situation of 
occupation.78 Why is this? What is unique about the Israeli-Palestinian situation that 
makes the applicable legal framework so contentious? This section further details the 
historical and legal background that will provide a basis for the analysis of the legal 
framework that ought to be applied to the Palestinian territories, and explain the 
complexity of applying international law to this situation.79 
¶36  In June of 1967, during what is called “The Six Day War,” the IDF gained effective 
control over territories beyond the “Green Line,” which was a temporary border 
delineated by the 1949 armistice agreements between Israel and its neighboring 
countries.80 The international community generally saw Israel’s actions in this war as a 
legitimate use of force in accordance with the self-defense doctrine, after its neighboring 
countries were moving troops, removing UN peacekeeping forces, and closing the Straits 
of Tiran to Israeli vessels,81 clearly preparing to attack Israel. The territories Israel gained 
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in six days were three times as large as its territory on the eve of the war, and included 
the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza strip acquired from Egypt, the West Bank and East 
Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria.82 The Sinai Peninsula was 
returned to Egypt as part of the 1979 Peace Agreement between Egypt and Israel.83 The 
Golan Heights remain under Israeli control to this day; in 1981 Israel passed a law 
extending its law, jurisdiction, and administration to the Golan,84 without ever expressly 
stating that it was annexing the area. Nevertheless, both Israeli and international public 
opinion understood this law to be an annexation.85 In the early 1990s Prime Minister 
Rabin attempted to revive the possibility of returning it to Syria in case of a peace 
agreement, which clearly did not come into fruition.  
¶37  The Gaza Strip remained under Israeli occupation until 2005, when Israel 
unilaterally evicted its entire military and civilian presence from the territory in what it 
called the “Disengagement Plan.” Following the disengagement, the Hamas party won 
the 2006 Palestinian elections in Gaza, and an internal conflict began between Hamas and 
Fatah, the political party controlling the Palestinian Authority. Hamas then violently 
eliminated Fatah elements from Gaza, and gained exclusive control over the Strip, thus 
creating two separate regions of the OPT. Despite Israel’s claim that the occupation of 
the Gaza Strip ended with the Disengagement, the IDF continues to control the airspace, 
as well as access to the strip through land and sea. Gaza is also dependent on Israel for 
the supply of fuel and electricity,86 which Israel has not always steadily provided.87   
¶38  In 1967, only eight weeks after the end of the war, the Knesset adopted a law 
similar to the Golan Heights Law, extending its law, jurisdiction, and administration to 
East Jerusalem. Unlike the Golan, and despite harsh criticism by the international 
community, including the U.N. General Assembly, Security Council, and the ICJ,88 East 
Jerusalem was officially annexed when the Knesset adopted in 1980 the Basic Law: 
Jerusalem, Capital of Israel.89 Subsequent to the enactment of the 1967 law, Israel offered 
the Arab residents of East Jerusalem citizenship, but few accepted. Those who did not 
become citizens were given permanent resident status that included the right to vote for 
municipal elections and receive social security benefits.90 The municipality of Jerusalem 
administers the infrastructure and school system of East Jerusalem (with alleged 
discrimination),91 and finally, Palestinians residing in East Jerusalem cannot vote in 
general elections.92  
¶39  One of the territories that Israel acquired in 1967 is referred to as the West Bank (of 
the Jordan River). The West Bank had been under Jordanian administration since 
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194893—the year that both Israel and Jordan declared independence from the British 
mandate in their respective territories. Jordan claimed that it annexed the West Bank in 
1950, but this action was widely regarded in the international community, including the 
Arab League, as illegal and void.94 Thus, when the IDF seized the West Bank, the 
territory lacked a de jure sovereign,95 a fact that may have deep implications on any 
analysis of the applicable legal framework.  
¶40  In September 1993, Yasser Arafat and then Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, 
exchanged letters containing mutual recognition of the other’s existence and right to live 
side by side in peaceful coexistence. Subsequently, Israel recognized the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (hereinafter “PLO”) as the representative of the Palestinian 
people, and Israel and the PLO signed a “Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-
Government Arrangements,” also known as the Oslo Accords.96 The Accords recognized 
the Palestinian people’s right to govern themselves in the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip,97 and, along with later Interim Agreements,98 provided for a gradual transfer of 
administrative responsibilities from the IDF to a Palestinian Authority. The 1995 Interim 
Agreement divided the West Bank into three areas:  
• Area A includes the major Palestinian cities, and, thus, the vast majority of the 
Palestinian population. These areas are under the full control of the Palestinian 
Authority, in both civil and security administration.99  
• Area B includes Palestinian rural communities surrounding the major cities and 
is under the civil administrative control of the Palestinian Authority and the 
security control of the IDF.100  
• Area C includes all Israeli settlements and surrounding lands, the major roads, 
military posts, agricultural areas, nature reserves, and the Judean desert. These 
territories remained under Israel’s full civil and military control. They amount to 
sixty percent of the West Bank, and house a population of approximately 
180,000 Palestinians and 325,000 Israeli settlers.101  
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¶41  The Interim Agreement prohibited either party from taking any action that would 
change the status of these territories and Gaza “pending the outcome of the permanent 
status negotiations.”102 As is well known, Israel has since taken many actions that 
changed the status of these territories by expropriating lands, approving construction and 
expansion of settlements, and, of course, the construction of the security barrier, or the 
Wall.103 Furthermore, following the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin and 
consequent developments in the hostilities and political situation on both sides, reality did 
not allow for a full realization of the process envisaged in the Oslo and Interim 
Agreements.104 Accordingly, the parties have not been able to reach the anticipated 
permanent status agreement.  
¶42  In 2001, the Israeli cabinet adopted the first of a series of decisions to approve the 
construction of a security fence.105 The Fence is also known as the security barrier or the 
Wall.106 The Fence has become a major focus of legal, diplomatic, and popular 
contention, particularly due to several sections that were constructed on Palestinian 
territories and have caused a variety of  human rights violations. This project was a 
response to the wave of terrorism emanating from the West Bank in the 2000s and 
prevented the infiltration of terrorists into Israel.107 However, there has been a wave of 
criticism even within the Israeli system on the ulterior motives of the Wall’s construction, 
namely, the expansion of settlement lands.108 Since the very first stages of its 
construction, approximately two hundred cases109 have been brought before Israeli courts 
demanding changes in the course of the Wall or in the policies regulating the passage of 
Palestinian civilians. Some of these cases were successful.110 The construction also 
brought about the ICJ’s infamous Advisory Opinion, discussed in detail below, in section 
III(b).  
¶43  According to data collected from the Israeli Security Agency Publications, since 
2003 there has been a consistent decrease in the number of Israeli fatalities and injuries 
from Palestinian terrorist and other attacks (excluding rockets and mortars from the Gaza 
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strip).111 There have also been recorded decreases in the scope of terrorist attacks (as 
opposed to the injuries they cause) in the years since the construction of the Wall.112 
Although not all data is accessible, there has been a clear correlation between the 
construction of the Wall, the decrease in terrorist attacks, and an increase in non-violent 
resistance.113  
¶44  The proliferation of the non-violent movement includes efforts focused on the 
different aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These efforts include, inter alia, 
litigation, weekly marches against the Wall,114 dialogue and reconciliation efforts,115 local 
expressions of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement,116 detainees’ 
hunger strikes, the U.N. campaign for statehood, documentary films, and makeshift 
Palestinian settlements such as Bab Alshams. The development of the non-violent 
movement is likely the consequence of many factors, but the existence of a tangible, 
specific issue like the Wall is an issue that Palestinians can oppose and successfully 
change in the short term.  
¶45  The [Palestinian] prisoners are a masculine society or subculture that praises and 
glorifies the values of aggressiveness and sees nonviolence as feminine . . . the film [5 
Broken Cameras]117 has exposed the prisoners to something new. They suddenly 
discovered that the struggle of these “yuppies,” these “spineless” people from Bil’in and 
Na’alin118 isn’t simple at all, but demands faith and sacrifice, and bears with it not a little 
risk . . . The movie changed the minds of many of the prisoners regarding the nonviolent 
popular struggle . . . it shook up the prisoners’ macho culture and militaristic outlook . . . 
There is a ton of literature in the jails that explains and glorifies the armed struggle, but 
there aren’t any books about Mahatma Gandhi, for instance, or the struggle of the 
African-American citizens— Martin Luther King and others . . . this movie can help 
prevent killing and fresh graves [from being dug] in this land.119 
¶46  This passage is an expression of some of the underlying transformations in 
Palestinian resistance culture today. As the non-violent movement continues to claim 
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greater victories, more activists will join its ranks, which shows how it is the most 
effective and equitable manner in which to fight the occupation.  
¶47  Israeli security authorities see these non-violent demonstrations as a security 
threat,120 and, in many cases, have used excessive crowd control measures to disperse 
them, causing increasing numbers of deaths and injuries to civilians.121 The IDF regularly 
declares protest venues as closed military zones to try to prevent the protests from taking 
place. When they do, the military arrests protesters (Palestinians, Israelis, and foreigners) 
and in some cases uses tear gas, rubber coated bullets, and other violent measures against 
non-violent protesters.122 Nevertheless, the Palestinians are undeterred and continue 
fighting for their rights in these demonstrations, hoping this will eventually bring a 
change to their reality. This issue in particular will be further discussed in section V.  
¶48  I do not make these observations on the non-violent resistance to paint a skewed 
picture of reality in the region. Israel remains constantly challenged by real and 
dangerous security threats to its citizens and troops.123 However, it is the complexity of 
this situation, the decades of occupation and oppression, and the high toll the conflict 
takes on both the Israeli and Palestinian societies that all justify continuous attempts to 
offer legal, political, and social solutions that will improve it. Furthermore, the rise in the 
non-violent resistance justifies taking a closer look, particularly at the possibility of 
increased human rights protections.  
¶49  International relations scholar Adam Roberts claims there is no need to try to prove 
that any of Israel’s commitments pass an applicability test in a given situation.124 He 
argues that the burden of proof to show that Israel’s IHL obligations do not apply to the 
occupied territories is on Israel, and until the burden is met, the assumption is that Israel 
must conform to the terms of this legal framework.125 I tend to disagree with this notion, 
particularly because the Israeli-Palestinian situation is a unique one in many aspects of 
international law, and thus requires further inquiry. Moreover, in light of the disputable 
developments toward the application of human rights law to occupation, and the 
previously stipulated need to investigate the substantive obligations in context, the 
ensuing analysis is pertinent. In the following passages I summarize the different 
approaches to the question of the applicable legal framework to the Palestinian territories, 
including the Israeli, international, and Palestinian approaches.  
IV.  THE OPT CONUNDRUM: WHAT IS THE APPLICABLE LEGAL FRAMEWORK?  
¶50  Israel is a party to the Geneva Conventions, but as explained below, its official 
stance is that the Fourth Geneva Convention does not apply de jure to the Occupied 
Territories. On the opposite side of the spectrum, the international legal community has 
generally rejected this proposition, and continues to maintain that the Fourth Geneva 
Convention and additional IHL, as well as some human rights norms, fully apply to the 
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West Bank and Gaza.126 The following sections introduce some of the primary actors’ 
analyses concerning the OPT situation.  
A.   The confines of ambiguity: The official Israeli approach 
¶51  Conceivably, the unique lack of sovereignty in the West Bank on the eve of the Six 
Day War allowed Israel to maintain a vague approach to the applicable legal framework 
in the West Bank, leaving sufficient doubt as to whether it was acting in contrast to 
international law. This approach has developed through a complex interaction between 
ever-changing government policies, Supreme Court jurisprudence including international 
and domestic legal contributions, IDF and internal security policies, the military legal 
system administering the OPT, and internal and external political pressures. Rather than 
leading to a unified, coherent position, the democratic nature of the Israeli system has led 
to a fabric of contradicting interpretations of both reality and the law.  
 
1.   The Applicability of IHL 
 
¶52  Despite the fact that the Israeli authorities have generally administered the West 
Bank in accordance with the law of occupation, the Israeli government has never 
officially recognized the applicability of this body of law on the territories, with one 
exception. For a brief, four-month period, the Military Commander for the West Bank 
issued, and then repealed, an order that provided that military courts will observe the 
provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention in matters concerning judicial proceedings, 
and that in case of contradiction between the order and the Convention, the Convention 
shall prevail.127 In 1971, Israel’s Attorney General expressed the position that Israel 
would not acknowledge the de jure applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention, 
because under Common Article 2 of the Conventions, they apply only to “occupation of 
the territory of a High Contracting Party.”128 However, Israel will observe the 
Convention’s “humanitarian provisions.”129 This approach has prevailed as the official 
Israeli position, despite the lack of enumeration of the provisions Israel considered 
“humanitarian,” and despite several contradicting court decisions, discussed below.   
¶53   The Israeli Supreme Court decided in the late 1970s, shortly after the beginning of 
the occupation, to apply The Hague Regulations to the OTP.130 In the same decision, the 
court found that Israel’s status with regard to the “held” territories is that of an occupying 
power.131 This may seem like a trivial statement, but it is important to mention in light of 
recent developments in which Israeli officials have claimed that there is no occupation.132 
                                                        
126
 AMNESTY INT’L, ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: THE PLACE OF THE FENCE/WALL IN 




 Rubin, supra note 82, at ¶¶ 46-47.  
128
 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 24, at 17.  
129
 Meir Shamgar, The Observance of International Law in the Administered Territories, 1 Isr. Y.B. H.R. 
262 (1971).  
130
 HCJ 610/78 Oiev and Others v. Minister of Defense 33(2) PD 113 [1979] (Isr.).  
131
 Id. at 115.  
132
 LEVY, supra note 78.  
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS [2014 
 168
The legal question as the court framed it was whether the petitioners, who the court 
recognized as protected persons within the meaning of IHL, had standing to demand their 
rights according to The Hague and Geneva Conventions. The second question was 
whether the provisions in question had been adopted into domestic law. Despite earlier 
decisions by the Supreme Court determining that both the Geneva and the Hague 
Conventions are constitutive and not customary international law, the court now held, 
relying on an article by Professor Yoram Dinstein,133 that the Hague Conventions are in 
fact a codification of customary law. The Geneva Conventions, Professor Dinstein 
argued, cannot be invoked in an Israeli domestic court, because they were not adopted 
into Israeli law.134  
¶54  Interestingly, one of the primary claims by the respondents was that all of the 
Jewish settlements against which the petitioners complained were a part of the IDF’s 
national defense system. Thus, the military commander’s position was that the 
settlements were built due to security concerns, and only in strategically significant areas. 
The court accepted this position, qualifying the entire settlement establishment as legal 
and justified.135 In a concurring opinion in the case, panel Judge Landau mentioned in 
particular that article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits 
transferring populations into the occupied territory, is a constitutive provision. The judge 
relied on commentary to the Geneva Conventions edited by Jean Pictet,136 which states 
that article 49(6) “was adopted after some hesitation,” 137 implying it does not express a 
well-established custom. In this case, as well as many others, the respondents argued that 
they implement the humanitarian provisions of the Geneva Convention. The court 
intentionally did not address this argument, because of the finding that the Geneva 
Conventions could not be invoked, as they are non-customary.138  
¶55  Throughout its rich history of case law regarding the occupation, the court avoided 
making a clear determination on whether the convoluted official approach of the State 
was an appropriate interpretation of international law. In most cases the court narrowed 
its decision to the individual case before it, and found a way to apply particular IHL 
provisions that the parties could agree were “humanitarian;” some of which the court also 
recognized as customary international law.139 In the Ajouri Case,140 the respondents, the 
Military Commander for the West Bank, claimed that the orders in question did not 
violate international law because they were within the scope of article 78 of the Fourth 
                                                        
133
 Yoram Dinstein, an international law scholar and Professor Emeritus at Tel Aviv University, is a 
prominent authority on international humanitarian law. See Yoram Dinstein, The Verdict in the Matter of 
Pithat Rafiah (HCJ 302/72 Abu Hilou and Others v. The Government of Israel), 3 TEL AVIV U. L. REV. 934 
(1974). 
134
 HCJ 610/78 Oiev and Others v. Minister of Defense 33(2) PD 113, 118 [1979] (Isr.).  
135
 Id. at 123-4.  
136
 Jean Pictet, Swiss expert on international humanitarian law, served as Vice President of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, and primary architect of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
137
 4 JEAN PICTET. COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF 
CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 283 (1958).  
138
 HCJ 610/78 Oiev and Others v. Minister of Def. 33(2) PD 113, 126-7 [1979] (Isr.). 
139
 E.g., HCJ. 7015/02 Kifah Mohammad Ahmed Ajouri v. Military Commander for the West Bank 56(6) 
PD 352, ¶ 13 [2002] (Isr.). It is unclear what the distinction is, according to this doctrine, between 
humanitarian and non-humanitarian articles of the Fourth Geneva Convention, as the entirety of the Geneva 
Conventions is a codification of international humanitarian law.  
140
 Id. 
Vol. 12:2] Keren Greenblatt 
   169
Geneva Convention, relating to assigned residence and internment. Here again the 
respondents quoted the long-established practice of the Israeli government applying the 
“humanitarian” parts of the Fourth Convention.141 Relying on this statement, the court 
assumed that the relevant provisions to the case at hand were in fact among the 
“humanitarian provisions,” so there was no need to further review the validity of the 
government’s interpretation of international law.142   
¶56  In the same opinion, the court asserted that the forced displacement of the 
petitioners was a violation of human rights. However, the court legitimized this violation 
with the security justification. The court decided that the scope of the permitted violation 
of human rights is determined by the law of occupation, as codified in The Hague and 
Geneva Conventions.143 The court also found that article 78 is lex specialis vis-à-vis 
article 49, which generally prohibits deportation and forcible transfer, rendering an 
analysis of the application of article 49 unnecessary.144 It followed that the military 
commander had the authority to issue his order in accordance with article 78, and there 
was no “violation of human rights protected by international humanitarian law.”145 
¶57  In a more recent decision from 2004, the petitioners asked the Supreme Court for 
remedies for a series of human rights violations by the IDF in Gaza, caused by an active 
military operation there.146 Possibly due to the urgency of the decision, as it was given 
during an active situation of armed conflict, the court determined without extensive 
analysis that the IDF is obliged to do everything in its power to refrain from harming the 
civilian population and to ensure fundamental human rights. In the majority opinion, 
Chief Justice Aharon Barak stated that Israel’s military conduct in Gaza, as far as it 
concerns the local civilian population, is governed by the Fourth Hague Convention and 
the Fourth Geneva Convention, as well as the general principles of Israeli administrative 
law.147 Justice Barak then continued to refer generally to the fundamental principles of 
IHL in terms of its requirement to ensure protection of the civilian population. In a 
concurring opinion, Justice Beinisch repeated the same general reference, without any 
mention of the “humanitarian provisions” or the refusal of the government to apply 
Geneva IV de jure.148  
¶58  Although this decision applied particularly to the situation in Gaza, and involved 
active conflict, the Gaza Strip was at that time still under occupation similar to the West 
Bank. It is curious that the court did not repeat the government’s insistence on the 
“humanitarian provisions” approach here, even though it cited previous decisions in the 
same vein that emphasized the government’s narrow policy.149  
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¶59  Since the eruption of the second Intifada150 in September 2000 and the construction 
of the Wall, there has been a natural increase in human rights litigation. In that period, the 
Supreme Court gave several other decisions that were also inconsistent with the usual 
position regarding the applicability of IHL.151 In an interview with a former legal advisor 
to the International Law Branch of the IDF Military Advocate General, 152 the former 
advisor stated that the inconsistency was also on the part of the state, whose 
representatives failed in some cases to make that argument. The legal advisor added that 
Israeli authorities received these decisions with a total lack of concern. He stipulated that 
since the 1970s and 1980s, when making the argument on the inapplicability of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention was pertinent for policy makers and State Attorneys alike, 
those people have been replaced and the flood of human rights cases made them less 
meticulous about it. “Now,” he added, “no one is fooling himself to think that anyone 
‘outside’ will ever buy this argument.”153  
¶60  Finally, in a case from 2009 concerning the conditions of detainees from the West 
Bank, the petitioners argued that legal attitudes toward the Fourth Geneva Convention 
have changed, and it is now considered customary international law.154 In response, the 
court returns to its usual doctrine, and stated that regardless of the validity of that 
argument, the judicial review of Israel’s conduct in the OPT is based on the government’s 
well-established decision to apply the humanitarian provisions of the Convention as a 
matter of policy. The court then stated that it should continue its long practice of 
respecting the Convention’s customary provisions in its review.155 However, in her 
majority opinion, Chief Justice Beinisch finally added that there was no doubt that where 
there was an explicit Israeli statute that is inconsistent with international law, even if it is 
customary international law, the Israeli law prevails.156  
2.   The applicability of human rights law 
¶61  With regard to this legal framework, Israel has also presented a puzzling position. 
The Almadany case157 dealt with the IDF preventing food supplies from going into a 
church complex in the city of Bethlehem where Palestinian citizens and clergy were 
under siege alongside a group of armed insurgents. In his decision, Chief Justice Barak 
expressed the Court’s sentiment concerning the application of human rights:  
¶62  The State of Israel is a state of Jewish and democratic values. We established a law-
abiding state that realizes its national goals and the vision of generations, and is doing so 
in recognition and actualization of human rights in general and human dignity in 
particular. Between [a democratic state fighting against terrorists trying to destroy it, and 
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the recognition of fundamental human rights] there is harmony and compatibility, not a 
contrast and estrangement.158  
¶63  In the Physicians for Human Rights case,159 Chief Justice Barak detailed the 
general principles of administrative law that accompany every Israeli soldier, and 
asserted that the military must act in the territories, inter alia with fairness (substantive 
and procedural), reasonableness, and proportionality while properly balancing between 
individual liberties and public needs.160 When interpreting article 27 of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention, Barak asserted that in the core of this basic provision lay the 
recognition of human value and liberty and the sanctity of human life.161 He then 
compared this notion to section 1 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.162 Barak 
added that the duty of the military commander is twofold; first, a negative duty to avoid 
actions that harm the local civilians, and second, the positive duty to take required lawful 
actions that ensure that the local civilians will not be harmed. These duties must be 
carried out with reason and proportionality according to the needs in the particular 
situation.   
¶64  The Yassin case from 2002163 was a petition by administrative detainees against the 
conditions of their detention facility. The Court found that because detainees enjoy the 
presumption of innocence, not only should their conditions be comparable to those of 
normal prisoners, but also that everything must be done so that their conditions will be 
better. The security considerations that led to their arrest did not justify inadequate 
conditions.164 The Court laid down the normative framework that governs the 
determination of detention conditions—above all, the principle of human dignity as 
expressed in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and the values of Israel as a Jewish 
and democratic state. This normative framework tries to delicately balance the need to 
ensure detention conditions that are as humane as possible, with the need to ensure the 
security of the state.  
¶65  Following its interpretation of the applicable statutes and regulations that applied to 
the situation, the Court turned to international law. It contended that there is an 
international array of provisions concerning conditions of custody, the most important of 
which is in article 10(1) of the ICCPR.165 This provision expresses customary 
international law according to the Court, and additionally is in line with the provisions of 
Basic Law: Human Dignity. It protects the dignity of every person, including a detainee. 
Furthermore, the decision cited the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons 
Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment.166 Even though these principles have no 
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direct applicability in Israel’s domestic law, they provide standards for a reasonable 
governmental authority to abide by.167 
¶66  Despite the lack of a clear statement, one may infer that the affirmation that U.N. 
Principles do not have direct applicability in Israel means that article 10 of the ICCPR 
does. The decision finally returned to the balance between individual liberty and public 
safety, explaining the guiding principle in this balance: every person is entitled to his 
human rights, even when in custody. Detention does not in itself deprive a person of any 
right, unless it is necessary and stems from the fact of the detention or when it is 
prescribed by law.168  
¶67  This case is a valuable example of how the Israeli Supreme Court perceives human 
rights. Although the court acknowledges that some human rights may be customary, and 
that Israel is a party to the ICCPR, it refrains from expressly implementing the treaty 
norms directly to the cases at hand. In order to apply, such norms need to be in line with 
the domestic constitutional protections provided by the basic laws. On the other hand, the 
Court deems human rights to be part of the natural law principles,169 and as such are an 
official source of law to be used by the High Court of Justice.170 In the Darwish case from 
1980,171 former Chief Justice Haim Cohen applied this concept precisely in his minority 
opinion:  
It is the right of a person in Israel, who was sentenced to imprisonment (or 
lawfully arrested), to be detained in conditions that allow civilized human 
life. It makes no difference that this right is not explicitly provided in any 
law: this right is one of the fundamental rights of man, and in a democratic 
law-abiding state it is so obvious, that it is of equal value if it were 
prescribed by law.172 
¶68  Notably, despite the assertion that Israel has promoted and maintained a human 
rights philosophy as a fundamental pillar of its domestic legal system, it also has, since 
the days of the British Mandate in 1945, been in an official state of emergency. The state 
of emergency is manifested in several legislative forms, including the Defense 
Regulations (Emergency)173 enacted by the British Mandate to allow it to combat the 
Jewish and Arab resistance organizations during the British rule. The Regulations and 
other emergency legislation contain, inter alia, vast authorities for the security sector, the 
establishment and operation of military courts and security related criminal offences, and 
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no consideration for human rights.174 The state of emergency, declared by the Knesset175 
in accordance with Basic Law: The Government,176 has been renewed annually without 
fail since the establishment of the state of Israel, and until May of last year.177  
¶69  To the various international bodies, Israel has expressed adamant denial that the 
human rights Covenants are applicable to the OPT.178 In its initial report to the Human 
Rights Committee, submitted in 1998,179 Israel discussed its dualistic approach to the 
implementation of treaties in its domestic law. It stated that the provisions of the ICCPR 
were not adopted into the Israeli law by Knesset legislation, and so the Covenant does not 
by itself create enforceable individual rights in Israeli courts. However, the basic rights 
provided in the ICCPR are to a great extent already protected by domestic legislation or 
case law. For this reason the government did not deem it necessary to enact implementing 
legislation.180 Furthermore, the explanatory notes for the draft Basic Laws explicitly 
mention Israel’s ratification of the ICCPR as a motivation to legislate those constitutional 
norms.181 
¶70  In addition to the written report, Israel also testified before the Human Rights 
Committee, adding further explanations on the applicability of the ICCPR to the OPT. 
One representative referred to the Interpretation of article 2(1) by the Legal Advisor to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It seems that the Legal Advisor accepted the prevalent 
interpretation that the ICCPR was meant to apply extraterritorially for persons under that 
state’s jurisdiction.182 The Israeli representative stated that the primary question is 
whether the Palestinians are in fact under Israel’s jurisdiction. He added that to 
complicate matters, the extent of the rights and responsibilities in the OPT was also 
affected by the norms of IHL that govern the occupation, and whether such norms are 
compatible with the obligations in the ICCPR.183  Israel thus took the position that there 
is a clear separation between IHL and human rights law, which were each designed for 
different situations, and that the IHL framework was much more appropriate for the 
OPT.184 It followed that the Covenants do not directly apply to the OPT.185  
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¶71  The Israeli representative also mentioned the Interim Agreements,186 which 
contained a mutual commitment to human rights and the rule of law in the gradual 
transfer of responsibilities from Israel to the Palestinian Authority, stating that it would 
be inappropriate for Israel to account for such issues, as they were under the 
responsibility of the Palestinians.187    
¶72  In its second periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, Israel held to its 
position that the ICCPR does not apply to the OPT, which, Israel contended, is not 
subject to its sovereign territory and jurisdiction.188 In contrast to the position presented 
by the Israeli Representative in the previous session, Israel seemingly returned in this 
case to the interpretation of article 2(1) of the Covenant, by which the requirement for 
applicability is territory and jurisdiction. Israel based this position once again on what it 
called the “well-established” distinction between IHL and human rights law, and asserted 
that consequently the Committee had no mandate to address events that occurred in the 
OPT and were part of the conflict.189 Once again Israel referred to the transfer of 
responsibility to the Palestinian authorities in accordance with the Interim Agreement, 
this time claiming that the “overwhelming majority” of responsibilities in the civil sphere 
were now under the jurisdiction of the Palestinians. It concluded this issue with the 
determinate statement that considering this analysis, Israel cannot be held internationally 
responsible for ensuring the rights of the Covenant in the OPT.190 
¶73  Israel reiterated this position with identical wording in its reports to the U.N. 
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights on the implementation of the 
ICESCR.191  
3.   Parliamentary response 
¶74  Several elements in Israeli society have realized that the government’s refusal to 
apply the Fourth Geneva Convention, as well as its international human rights 
obligations, to the OPT allows it to evade many of its responsibilities toward the 
Palestinian population. The response to this concern was partially manifested in a draft 
bill submitted to the Knesset by Member of the Knesset (MK) Mohammad Barakke 
(joined by 3 more MKs), titled “Implementation of the Geneva Convention on the 
Territories Held by the Israeli Military Since the June 1967 War (2011).”192 The bill 
requires that actions taken by any Israeli authority or by the Israeli military in the 
territories will not deviate from the provisions of the Convention, and that any such 
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deviation will constitute a criminal offence.193 The same MKs submitted an identical draft 
in 2003.194 Neither of these bills progressed in the legislative process. 
¶75   In sum, although the official Israeli position suffers from ambiguity, it can be 
represented in the following broad terms: 
• The Hague Regulations represent customary international law and apply to the 
OPT.  
• The Israeli authorities, as a matter of policy, apply those provisions of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention in that they consider its humanitarian provisions, but do not 
apply the Convention de jure.  
• The human rights instruments that Israel is a member of do not directly apply in 
the domestic law and cannot be directly invoked in its courts. The government 
denies applicability of any of the human rights instruments to which it is party to 
the OPT. However, the Supreme Court may apply customary provisions and 
general concepts of human rights law to particular cases brought to it, if there 
are no contradicting domestic legal provisions, as well as no convincing security 
concerns. 
¶76 Many human rights are guaranteed by Israel’s domestic legislation, and can be relied on 
in conjunction with international norms before the courts.  
V.   APPROACHES OF INTERNATIONAL BODIES  
A.   The United Nations 
¶77  Since its earliest days, the General Assembly has passed countless resolutions 
concerning the relationship between Israel and Palestine. It would be futile to review 
even the best known of those resolutions in the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that 
due to the political and non-legal nature of the General Assembly, these resolutions have 
been directly correlated with the large number of Arab and Muslim states that have been 
consistently taking an anti-Israeli position.  
¶78  Particularly addressing the questions of applicability of international legal 
frameworks to the OPT, the General Assembly adopted several relevant resolutions in 
which it affirmed that the Fourth Geneva Convention is applicable to the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories, including East Jerusalem, and other Arab territories occupied by 
Israel since 1967,195 and called on Israel to accept de jure applicability of the 
Convention.196 The General Assembly included in these resolutions reference to the 
Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention held in 
1999, which also adopted declarations in the same vein.197 Notably, the ICRC has also 
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been consistent in its position that the Fourth Geneva Convention applied de jure to the 
OPT.198 
¶79  The Security Council, which does possess binding legal authority, has observed this 
interpretation as well. As early as 1969 it has taken the position that Israel must 
scrupulously observe the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and international law 
governing military occupation.199 It has subsequently reaffirmed this position in 
numerous other resolutions,200 and has called upon the high contracting parties to the 
Convention to ensure Israel’s respect for its obligations under the Convention in 
accordance with article 1.201   
¶80  With regard to the applicability to the OPT of Israel’s human rights obligations, the 
General Assembly reaffirmed in its resolutions that the ICCPR, ICESCR and the CRC, 
all of which Israel has ratified, should be respected in the OPT.202 The Security Council 
has taken a more conservative approach, and has not made explicit statements on the 
direct applicability of the human rights Covenants.203    
¶81  The Human Rights Committee has expressed concern at Israel’s attitude and came 
to the conclusion that in the current context, the provisions of the ICCPR do apply in the 
OPT and to Israel’s conduct that affects the enjoyment of the Palestinian’s rights 
enumerated in the Covenant. 204 The Committee related its position to the long duration of 
Israel’s presence in the territories, Israel’s ambiguous attitude towards the future status of 
the OPT, and the effective jurisdiction the Israeli security forces have in the OPT.205  
¶82  As explained in section III(a)(3), Israel contended before the Human Rights 
Committee that the ICCPR cannot be applied directly to the OPT by way of creating 
obligations for Israel toward the Palestinian population. In response to this position, 
which was replicated before the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 
the Committee held the same view as the Human Rights Committee: the obligations 
emanating from the ICESCR apply to all territories under the effective control of a State 
Party.206  
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B.   The International Court of Justice 
¶83  In December 2003, the General Assembly adopted a resolution requesting the ICJ 
to give an advisory opinion on the question of the legal consequences from the 
construction of the Wall in the Palestinian territories, considering rules and principles of 
international law.207    
¶84  Israel refused to address the merits of the advisory opinion because of its 
contention that the court had no jurisdiction on this matter, and even if it does it should 
refuse for a variety of procedural reasons. The court analyzed each of these arguments 
and concluded that it does in fact have jurisdiction, and found no compelling reason to 
use its discretion so as not to issue the Opinion.208 Israel then argued that the Court could 
not issue the opinion because it did not have the facts needed to make a legal 
determination. The facts it was missing were, namely, the security threats the Wall was 
built in a response to, and the effects that it had on the threat and on the Palestinian 
population. The court found that it does have sufficient evidence to give the advisory 
opinion, including information on Israel’s security concerns.209   
¶85  The ICJ began its analysis with a historical account dating back to the Ottoman 
Empire, and continued to establish that Israel has been de jure an occupying power in the 
West Bank since 1967, based on article 42 of the Hague Regulations.210   
¶86  With regards to applicable IHL norms, the Court noted that although Israel is not a 
party to the Hague Conventions and Regulations, it is well established in the text of the 
Hague Conventions, as well as in the Nuremburg and other tribunals jurisprudence, that 
this is a declaratory instrument of universally recognized customary international law.211  
¶87  With regard to the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Court noted that article 154 of 
the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that the Fourth Convention is supplementary to 
section III of the Hague Regulations, which relates to situations of belligerent 
occupation.212 It then noted that Israel ratified the Geneva Conventions, and did not attach 
any relevant reservations.213 The Court then mentioned that the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization, in the name of the Palestinian people, submitted a unilateral declaration to 
Switzerland as the depositary of the Geneva Conventions that it undertook to apply the 
four Geneva Conventions and the two additional Protocols.214 However, the Swiss 
depositary determined it was not in a position to decide whether this declaration 
constituted an accession, 215 since this was years prior to the General Assembly accepting 
Palestine as a non-member State.  
¶88  The court went on to analyze Common Article (CA) 2 of the Conventions in 
accordance with the law of treaties, in response to Israel’s argument that it does not apply 
the Fourth Geneva Convention de jure due to CA 2’s requirement that the occupied 
                                                        
207
 G.A. Res. ES-10/14, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-10/14 (8 December, 2003).   
208
 The Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 36, at 14-54.  
209
 Id. at 55-58.  
210
 Id. at 70-78.  
211
 Id. at 89.   
212
 Id.  
213
 Id. at 91.  
214
 Id.  
215
 1949 Conventions and Additional Protocols, and their Commentaries, ICRC, 
http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreaties1949.xsp. 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS [2014 
 178
territory is of a High Contracting Party.216 The first paragraph of CA 2 requires two 
conditions for the Conventions to apply: (1) an armed conflict and (2) that the conflict is 
between two Contracting Parties.217 However, the following paragraph, as determined by 
the Court, was not meant to restrict applicability when the occupied territory is not of a 
Contracting Party. It was rather intended to clarify that the Convention still applies even 
when the occupation is met with no armed resistance.218 This interpretation is confirmed 
by the drafters’ intent to protect civilians under occupation regardless of how the 
occupation came into existence, as demonstrated in the Convention’s records of 
negotiations.219  
¶89  In its ultimate finding that the Fourth Geneva Convention fully applies to the OPT, 
the court also awarded significance to the fact that the High Contracting Parties to the 
Geneva Conventions, the ICRC, as well as the U.N. General Assembly and Security 
Council, have all issued statements and resolutions since 1967 asserting the same 
position.220 
¶90  Subsequently, the Court continued with an analysis of the applicability of human 
rights law to the OPT, relying heavily on its previous Advisory Opinion on the issue of 
nuclear weapons.221 First, in the nuclear weapons Opinion, the Court found that the 
protection of the rights provided by the ICCPR does not cease in times of war, unless 
derogated through the specific procedure and requirements in article 4 of the Covenant.222 
Second, the Court provided an analysis of the extra-territorial applicability of the ICCPR, 
including the different approaches expressed by other international bodies, as reviewed in 
the previous sections.223 It concluded that the ICCPR not only applies in conjunction with 
IHL, but also provides for extra-territorial applicability in situations of effective control, 
such as the OPT.224   
¶91  The Court finally addressed the ICESCR and the CRC, and concluded that in these 
cases too, Israel is bound by its obligations under the Conventions in the areas where it 
exercises jurisdiction, and is required to lift any obstacle to the enjoyment of these rights 
in areas where the Palestinian Authorities have jurisdiction and control.225 
C.  The Palestinian approach 
¶92  In the written statement submitted by the Palestinians to the ICJ for its Advisory 
Opinion on the Wall, the Palestinians contended first that Israel remains the occupying 
power of the Palestinian Territories, even after the transfer of certain areas and 
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responsibilities to the Palestinian Authority.226 They further argue, relying on the ICRC’s 
determination,227 that as the occupying power Israel must comply with the provisions of 
the Fourth Geneva Convention with regard to the protection of the Palestinian 
Population.228  
¶93  Notwithstanding the obligations under the laws of occupation, the Palestinians 
argue that this application does not nullify international human rights law, which is 
binding on Israel in its conduct in the OPT.229 The Palestinians also acknowledge that in 
certain circumstances such as armed conflict, some human rights can be lawfully 
violated, but only when certain conditions are met, as laid out in the human rights 
Covenants.230 The Palestinians then turn to apply this proposition to particular actions 
Israel took in the context of the Wall, including in their analysis concepts such as the 
duties to examine alternatives231 and to cause the least possible harm to human rights,232 
as well as using legitimate versus extraneous considerations in planning the Wall’s 
route.233 Finally, the Statement concludes with an enumeration of many of the rights that 
were expected to be violated by the construction, including the right to work, health, 
education, family and social life.234 By erecting the Wall, Israel evades its obligation to 
protect Palestinian human rights, and thus is in breach of international law.235  
D.   Discussion  
¶94  The Israeli argument that the Geneva Conventions only apply to occupation of the 
territory of a High Contracting Party is not convincing. Common Article 2 also provides 
in its third paragraph that:  
¶95  Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present 
Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual 
relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the said 
Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof.236 
¶96  In its simplest interpretation, this paragraph requires a High Contracting Party to 
apply its rules even to a non-contracting “power,” as long as the latter accepts and applies 
the provisions of the Convention. Furthermore, it has been suggested that based on the 
Palestinian’s right to self-determination, although they did not at the start of the 
occupation have a government with official title to the territory, sovereignty lies in the 
people, not in a government.237 In this sense, the notion that the Palestinian people were 
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the de facto sovereign of the land prior to the occupation further weakens the Israeli 
argument that the lands had no sovereign.238 Finally, it seems that Israel stands alone in 
its insistence on this evasive approach, when there is an apparent consensus in the 
international community that at the very least, the Fourth Geneva Convention applies de 
jure to the OPT.  
¶97  From the review in section I of the development of the law of occupation, it is clear 
that throughout the past two hundred years, this body of law has evolved in a very 
particular trajectory—that is, an increasing emphasis on protection of the individual 
rights of a civilian population. The most recent development views the human rights 
framework as a complementary one in cases of lacunae or interpretational challenges. It 
seems only natural that the next link in the chain will be a full implementation of human 
rights law, with some limited derogations or restrictions due to the unique circumstances 
of the occupation. Such restrictions would be subject to the highest scrutiny, and could 
not be easily justified by general security claims without requiring the state to provide 
adequate, specific reasoning that meets the standards set out in the human rights 
Covenants, including necessity, proportionality, legitimate aim, and non-
discrimination.239 
¶98  It seems that the main thrust of international legal and scholarly attempts to address 
the grave human rights situation in the OPT is calling Israel to fully comply with its 
obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention.240 One more progressive suggestion by 
an Israeli scholar, in addition to the Fourth Convention, was to use the human rights 
instruments as a guide for the occupant in the administration of prolonged occupation, 
just as civilian governments would in administering their own territories.241 Another 
creative suggestion was for the international community to declare time limitations on the 
possible duration of occupation, and possibly even to transfer the administration of an 
occupied territory when it exceeds that time limit to an international authority.242 In my 
view, fully applying the Fourth Convention as well as these creative suggestions are all 
insufficient responses.  
¶99  Without a permanent peace agreement, the occupation will not come to an end. 
Until that day, I propose implementing human rights law as the primary legal framework, 
and administering the OPT through a substantive human rights lens. This will at the very 
least alleviate some of the harsh burdens of the occupation, and effectively catalyze a 
lasting solution that will end the occupation. 
¶100  As reviewed in section I(a), the law of occupation has been advancing toward 
incorporation of human rights law in conjunction with IHL. In addition to the fact that an 
increasing number of interpreters of international law accept that the primary human 
rights instruments apply to Israel’s conduct in the OPT, these developments strengthen 
the argument that some form of international human rights law is applicable to this 
occupation. However, one of the problems is that none of the bodies that have asserted 
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this view has provided coherent, practical guidance on how they expect Israel to 
practically apply these two legal frameworks concurrently.  
¶101  In a way, the Israeli Supreme Court has attempted to utilize this approach in several 
cases through the existing Israeli notions of the role of human rights in Israeli law. 243 The 
Supreme Court has ample experience in harmonizing several sources of law that lack an 
internal hierarchy when there are no clear answers in statutes. These sources include 
Jewish law, common law, customary international law, and general concepts of natural 
law.244 Nevertheless, the Court’s application of human rights norms vis-à-vis domestic 
security and emergency regulations to this day has proved inadequate for the broad 
protection of the rights of the Palestinians.  
¶102  The co-application of IHL and human rights law is understandably unclear, since it 
is a relatively recent development. But in the context of the Palestinian Territories, I 
argue more than simply to say that human rights should be the primary legal framework 
for Israel’s conduct. I argue that Israel ought to adopt a multi-faceted approach in which 
it (1) directly applies its international human rights obligations to the OPT; (2) applies 
specific IHL notions to provide the conceptual foundation and authority for its 
administration of the OPT; and (3) subjects its derogations, restrictions and violations of 
human rights to judicial review, in accordance with the methodology provided by the 
human rights Covenants. When scrutinizing the conduct of Israeli authorities and security 
forces, the Israeli Court would be able to use as guidance the abundance of jurisprudence 
developed by international tribunals in their ICCPR related decisions.  
¶103  It would not be beneficial to exclusively apply human rights law to the OPT. 
Several of the fundamental concepts and provisions of IHL may prove useful to 
accommodate to the context of this situation. Generally, the concepts and provisions that 
ensure a future viable realization of the Palestinian right to self-determination, without 
diminishing from the responsibility of Israel to safely and justly administer the OPT, are 
the ones to be infused into the primary human rights construct. A few prime examples are 
the fundamental authority of the occupant to administer; the non-transfer of sovereignty 
and prohibition of annexation; the prohibition on the transfer of population; and the 
prohibition of unessential legislation, in order to maintain the continuous reminder of the 
temporal element of the occupation.245 With respect to legislation, the interpretation of 
“essential” should be extended through a human rights perspective as a guiding principle, 
to include economic, social and cultural rights.  
¶104  In addition to the simple injustice of Israel’s deficient protection of the Palestinians 
with its existing evasive approach, in the following passages I offer several additional 
arguments as to why adopting human rights law as the primary framework for the OPT is 
the preferable approach. First, IHL provides an insufficient degree and method of 
scrutiny of violations; second, Israel’s use of security justifications for human rights 
violations is inherently invalid in the OPT context; third, the proliferation of the non-
violent movement further undermines security justifications; fourth, the scope of the 
requirement of non-discrimination provided by IHL is not as wide or as inclusive as its 
parallel requirement in human rights law; fifth, the prolonged duration of this occupation 
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justifies a human rights approach; and, finally, a forward-thinking strategy by Israel 
would justify adopting this approach. 
1.   The Degree of Scrutiny 
¶105  The drafters of the Fourth Geneva Convention had the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights in mind, and included far-reaching individual rights protections.246 
However, the drafters designed the Fourth Geneva Convention to protect the civilian 
population in a short, temporary state of occupation,247 and did not provide adequate 
means to hold the occupant accountable for violations that may not rise to the level of 
grave breaches of the Convention.  
¶106  The Geneva Conventions specify which of their provisions constitute grave 
breaches, and require States Parties to enact criminal legislation to punish persons guilty 
of war crimes.248 The Conventions also establish universal jurisdiction for these war 
crimes.249 A few examples of acts that constitute grave breaches of Geneva IV when 
perpetrated against a protected person are willful killing, torture, willfully causing great 
suffering or serious injury to body or health, unlawful deportation and willful, unlawful, 
and extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military 
necessity.250   
¶107  Without analyzing whether Israel has committed war crimes, one major issue is the 
improbability of international prosecutions against Israeli officials for political and 
jurisdictional reasons.251 Even if we set aside Israel’s alleged impunity for grave 
breaches,252 IHL does not provide a sufficient system of accountability or enforcement 
for much of Israel’s adverse daily conduct in the OPT. Arguably, the majority of this 
conduct does not rise to the level of war crimes, but definitely constitutes human rights 
violations. A human rights approach would be able to effectively, and less dramatically, 
address these issues.  
2.   Security Justifications 
¶108  The Israeli government currently justifies the military’s human rights violations 
with security needs253 that, as demonstrated in section V, would not survive the scrutiny 
provided by the human rights Covenants. The existential security threat to the state of 
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Israel that could justify continuing to oppress the Palestinians has long been gone. The 
argument is not that there is no threat. Rather, it is for three primary reasons that the 
existing security concerns do not justify clinging to the minimum standards of IHL 
protection.  
1. The nature of the threat does not rise to the level of hostilities envisioned 
by IHL in order to justify suspending ordinary human rights 
protections;254  
2. The security concerns balanced against the rights of the Palestinians 
include protection of the settlements, themselves a breach of IHL;255 and 
thus,  
3. The occupation itself is the cause, as well as the target, of the security 
threat.  
¶109  In this situation, the occupation itself has become the embodiment of the armed 
conflict rather than a side effect. For this reason the occupation cannot be used as 
justification for applying a lesser form of protection to a population that has the right to 
self-determination. The normalization of the situation of conflict perpetuates a constant 
state of emergency that allows for restrictions and derogations from what has become the 
fundamental basis of international law—the protection of human rights. A progressive 
approach that only borrows the most essential norms from IHL, and in all other instances 
ensures the protection of human rights, will advance the goal of ending the occupation, 
while restricting rights only at the presence of a specific and imminent security threat or 
other legitimate circumstances, as provided by human rights law.  
3.   The Non-Violent Resistance 
¶110  As discussed in section II, non-violent resistance has become increasingly prevalent 
in the OPT. Conceptually, this movement is a component of the process of normalization. 
The longer an occupation lasts, the further it moves from a high-intensity armed conflict 
to a normalized situation of perpetual oppression. Conceivably, the resistance movements 
have undergone a parallel process of shying away from armed conflict and turning to 
other, legitimate methods. This could be attributed to the effectiveness of the Wall and 
other thwarting efforts by Israeli security, but it could also be seen as a societal change in 
trend.  
¶111  Be that as it may, when juxtaposed with the degree of oppression and rights 
violations, the non-violent activities significantly undermine Israel’s claims of continuous 
threats to its existence both toward the international community, and within the Israeli 
and Palestinian societies.  
¶112  In contrast, by applying a human rights framework, Israel’s ability to derogate 
human rights in the name of security would be considerably narrower, and would be 
subject to the requirements of non-discrimination, necessity, proportionality, and would 
require a nexus between the actions taken and the asserted legitimate aim.  
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4.   Non-Discrimination  
¶113  Currently, the Israeli legal system applies fully to the settlers in the West Bank. The 
Palestinians, on the other hand, are confined by the limitations of the military regime and 
its inconsistent application of certain IHL norms. This is an inherently discriminatory 
situation, for which IHL does not provide a proper solution. 
¶114  The principle of non-discrimination appears not only in the human rights 
instruments, but also in the Fourth Geneva Convention as a fundamental basis of 
application of the other substantive rights.256 However, the meaning of non-
discrimination in the Geneva context is non-discrimination in the application of the 
Convention itself, among protected persons.257 Furthermore, in his commentary, Jean 
Pictet explicitly mentions that although the enumerated categories of discrimination are 
not exhaustive, discrimination on the basis of nationality was intentionally not 
included.258 In other words, applying a minimal standard of protection in accordance with 
IHL to a population of one nationality, and a higher standard of protection in accordance 
with national law and international human rights to people of another nationality, does 
not constitute a violation of IHL.  
¶115  In contrast, human rights law provides a much stricter requirement of equality 
before the law and prohibition of discrimination on any grounds, including national 
origin.259 It also specifically requires non-discrimination in the application of the rights of 
the Covenants, without derogation under any circumstances on the rights to life, freedom 
from torture, cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment and freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion.260 If applied, this framework, as opposed to even the highest standard of 
IHL, can provide for an entirely different reality for the Palestinians if their rights are 
equalized to those enjoyed by the settlers, in accordance with the principle of non-
discrimination.  
5.   Prolonged Occupation 
¶116  Both concepts of military necessity and humanitarian concerns may, and ought to 
have, different manifestations in situations of active combat vis-à-vis occupation.261 The 
situation of prolonged occupation further reflects the conclusion of intense combat within 
that territory,262 and the transition to a situation of maintenance until a resolution to the 
underlying conflict is reached. 
¶117  Why then is there a fundamental problem with applying only the law of occupation 
framework? The reason most scholarly opinions, as reviewed in this paper, conclude at 
least some form of human rights application rather than adamantly adhering to IHL, is 
that traditional laws of occupation are in a sense a means to perpetuate the occupation, 
thus achieving its opposite goal. They do so through the set of rules designed to keep 
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things as they are, based on the anachronistic nineteenth century notions of short-term 
occupation in the midst of a full-fledged war.  
¶118  The understanding that the administration of an occupied territory should develop 
over time and acclimate to a situation of prolonged occupation is not new. Scholars as 
early as 1916 have asserted that the occupant must administer the territories as if they 
were in conditions of peace, and that in prolonged occupation, new legislation is 
essential.263 Although fully applying the Fourth Geneva Convention to the OPT would be 
a positive first step, it is clearly insufficient264 after 45 years of oppressive military rule.  
¶119  This argument supports the conclusion that a human rights framework would be 
more appropriate for the conditions of a prolonged occupation such as the OPT, because 
it would provide a fundamental basis for the life of the Palestinian population which is, or 
should be, more similar to a state at a time of peace than to a state in a situation of war.  
6.   Strategic Policy 
¶120  Israeli policy makers ought to adopt a forward-looking strategy. They ought to 
understand the possible implications of continuing to oppress the Palestinian population 
until the day the occupation ends, considering terrorism and violent resistance are mostly 
focused on ending that oppression. By applying human rights law and consequently 
improving their lives, Israel can ensure the Palestinians will be better prepared for a 
substantive democracy based on the rule of law when they assume full independence.  
¶121  In a sense, this strategic approach could lower the security threat to Israel when it 
will no longer be able to control the society it has been oppressing. Furthermore, it will 
allow the Palestinians to develop a viable economy, and focus their efforts on building 
the physical and conceptual infrastructure for their future independence, instead of 
focusing on resistance. Consequently, this could reduce threats to Israel's security in 
the short term as well. 
¶122  Notably, the human rights approach not only provides a stronger protection to the 
fundamental rights of the Palestinians, but it also assigns positive obligations and 
responsibilities to Israel to assist the Palestinians in preparing for independence. This 
includes, for example, helping in the design and training of effective law enforcement; 
preparing viable justice, taxation and social security systems; and establishing adequate 
health care facilities that are easily accessible and geographically widespread.  
7.   Challenges 
¶123  Finally, it is important to note some major challenges for the adoption of the human 
rights approach. First is the ineffectiveness of U.N. General Assembly and Security 
Council resolutions in changing Israeli conduct. Even if these bodies adopt hundreds of 
resolutions calling on Israel to comply with its human rights obligations in the OPT, they 
do not have the power to change Israeli policy. Second, this approach is not codified in 
any international instrument. As long as it exists only in academic papers, or even judicial 
opinions, Israel is not likely to see itself as bound by it, and would rather maintain its 
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convoluted approach and protect its political interests. Conceivably, the major human 
rights instruments could in the future add provisions explicitly stating that they apply in 
times of armed conflict, and that particularly in situations of prolonged occupation, they 
have primacy over IHL. However, this kind of codification is unlikely to take place 
quickly if at all, considering the difficulty of reaching agreement in such important 
multilateral treaties.  
¶124  Third, even if international and regional tribunals adopt this approach in their 
jurisprudence, their decisions are not binding to Israel. Such decisions could only be used 
as supporting sources for the interpretation of human rights law in Israeli courts. In 
addition to the improbability that this proposal would ever be adopted in full by the 
Israeli government, it suffers from an enforcement challenge. Israel is not a member of 
any regional organization, and cannot be held accountable by any of the existing human 
rights judicial bodies such as the European Court of Human Rights.  
¶125  This challenge is no different from a scenario in which Israel applies the Fourth 
Geneva Convention de jure, since it is also not a member of the International Criminal 
Court for individual prosecutions, and generally does not accept the jurisdiction of the 
ICJ for state level adjudication.265 With the exception of the universal jurisdiction option, 
the only tribunal that could practically hold Israeli authorities, officials and military 
personnel accountable for violations in accordance with human rights law standards is the 
Israeli Supreme Court. However, in order to change the Court’s application of law on 
Israel’s conduct in the OPT, a major policy shift would need to occur in the Israeli 
government. In the conclusion of this paper I further discuss how such a change could be 
advanced within the confines of the current system and political climate.  
V. BAB ALSHAMS 
¶126  Evidently, the proposed approach has the potential of significantly changing the 
socio-political landscape in the OPT. Following is a brief analysis of how this approach, 
if applied by the Israeli Supreme Court, could have produced a different result in the case 
of the Bab Alshams activists.   
¶127  The right to freedom of peaceful assembly is guaranteed in article 21 of the 
ICCPR,266 and also echoed in article 8 of the ICESCR.267 It is not one of the absolute 
rights, and can be subjected to certain restrictions if they meet all of the following 
conditions:268  
1. The restrictions are prescribed by law, 
2. They are necessary in a democratic society, and 
3. They are in the interests of a legitimate aim, i.e. national security, public 
safety, public order, public health or morals or the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others.269  
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¶128  Furthermore, in adopting laws that restrict this right, the right must be the rule and 
the restriction the exception.270 Consequently, the state is obliged to only place 
restrictions that are proportionate to the pursuance of the legitimate aim.271 According to 
article 4 of the ICCPR, in a state of emergency, certain rights can be derogated if the state 
can show that the situation constitutes a threat to the life of the nation, and that any 
derogation is strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.272 The Human Rights 
Committee determined further that although freedom of assembly was not included in 
article 4 as one of the rights that cannot be derogated in a state of emergency, the 
possibility of restricting freedom of assembly under the terms of article 21 is sufficient.273 
Thus, any derogation from the right to freedom of assembly could not be justified by the 
exigencies of a state of emergency.274  
¶129  In the past few years, since the increase of demonstrations against the Wall, the 
IDF has taken a variety of actions to quell the demonstrations. These include arresting 
organizers and participants, use of crowd-control measures to disperse protesters, and 
issuing orders declaring the protest venues closed military zones.275  
¶130  In 1967, the military commander of the West Bank issued an order prohibiting 
“incitement and hostile propaganda actions” by Palestinians,276 which includes vast 
discretion for military commanders and imposes restrictions on the freedom of assembly, 
expression and other rights.277 The Order is used to this day to charge, investigate, and 
arrest activists.278  
¶131  Despite statements by military personnel that restrictions are only placed on violent 
demonstrations, in reality the Order allows for the military commanders to prevent some 
protests from taking place before they even begin—for example, by refusing to grant 
permits or arresting protesters the night before a demonstration is planned.279  
¶132  As explained in the introduction to this paper, in the case of Bab Alshams the IDF 
was able to evict the activists through a security necessity exception provided by the 
Court in its injunction prohibiting eviction.280 This happened without regard to the fact 
that prior to the arrival of the security forces, the village was conducting peaceful 
activities and rioting only began after the forces started arresting the activists.281  
¶133  Does the eviction of Bab Alshams activists meet the conditions required by the 
ICCPR? First, the military commander in the West Bank has the legal authority to declare 
an area a closed military zone and take measures to restrict protests in accordance with 
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the laws of occupation and Order 101. This means that the IDF’s actions were prescribed 
by law.  
¶134  Second, in accordance with the Human Rights Committee General Comment 29 
and the report of the special rapporteur, restricting the right to freedom of assembly 
cannot undermine the democratic concepts of pluralism, tolerance, and 
broadmindedness.282 This means that despite meeting the legitimate aim requirement, the 
IDF would not be able to use security necessity as a blanket justification to quell every 
anti-occupation assembly. Rather, it would need to prove to the Court in each case that 
the threat to security or public order outweighs the obligation to protect the freedoms of 
assembly and expression.  
¶135  In this case, the IDF claimed that there is an actual probability that allowing the 
activists to remain in the area would lead to severe disturbances to the public order. In 
reality, although the respondents were right that the site became an attraction to dozens of 
other activists, the site is in fact located on a hill in an open, unpopulated area,283 and any 
violent action by protesters was done in the context of resisting arrest. Hence, in applying 
the correct balance through the human rights approach, the IDF’s claims of threats to the 
public order would not have been accepted.   
¶136  It can also easily be argued that declaring the area a closed military zone, evicting 
all the protesters, and arresting many as a response to the erection of twenty tents on a 
secluded hill is an astoundingly disproportionate response.  
¶137  In light of this analysis, the Court would have had to render the eviction unlawful, 
instruct the IDF to allow the reestablishment of the village, and possibly even order the 
military to compensate the organizers, particularly those who were arrested.   
VI.   CONCLUSION 
¶138  This paper offers a contextual approach to the Israeli-Palestinian situation, relying 
on the contemporary notion that human rights law generally applies to occupation. I have 
attempted to persuade the reader that due to the increasing prevalence of non-violent 
resistance, and the uniquely long duration of the occupation, an approach where the 
primary legal system is human rights law, and IHL is secondary, is the appropriate 
application of international law to the Palestinian Territories. The backward reality of this 
conflict is that the occupation itself has turned into the embodiment of the armed conflict, 
rather than being simply a side effect. This was somehow normalized into a long-standing 
situation of oppression of human rights in the OPT. Applying human rights law first, with 
the addition of IHL concepts detailed in the discussion above, seems to be the most 
adequate response to the injustice.  
¶139  Considering Israel’s decades of refusal to apply the Fourth Geneva Convention to 
the OPT, it is extremely unlikely that the proposed, highly progressive approach will be 
adopted by Israel. In a sense, there is an advantage to develop such theories in an 
academic setting, free from the confines of pragmatism and politics. For example, in an 
imagined ideal future where the independent, democratic state of Palestine lives 
peacefully beside the de-militarized state of Israel, those two states could have a special 
tribunal for human rights, which would serve as an appeals chamber for the Supreme 
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Courts of both states in matters concerning the application of their international human 
rights obligations. This of course is an unrealistic vision for the future, and might take a 
hundred years until we reach that point in the region. On the other hand, there are several 
realistic scenarios in which the proposed approach could be partially applied, and still 
significantly improve the state of human rights in the Palestinian Territories.  
¶140  One possibility is through litigation within the Israeli system. Although under the 
leadership of the new Chief Justice Asher Grunis the court is currently more 
conservative, there have been many groundbreaking cases that modified the conduct of 
the authorities in the OPT, including the torture decision,284 decisions changing the 
course of parts of the Wall,285 and the decision against the use of human shields.286  
¶141  Attempting to change the applicable legal system through Supreme Court litigation 
is quite a challenge, and definitely cannot be done in a broad, general sense. But it can 
change certain practices in the conduct of Israeli authorities, if increasing numbers of 
human rights violations cases will be brought before the court in which the arguments are 
persuasively based on this conceptual foundation. Furthermore, such arguments would 
need to be supported by a variety of international and comparative jurisprudence and 
legal literature. This would mean that as a first step, this proposal would have to be 
further developed by academics, international bodies, and judicial opinions elsewhere.   
¶142  Another possibility is through the inevitable accomplishment of a permanent peace 
agreement. In this scenario, similarly to the way the Oslo Accords were designed, the end 
of the occupation will not happen instantly, but will rather be a gradual process of 
transferring responsibilities. In the framework of such an agreement, it is quite plausible 
to require that until full responsibilities are transferred to the Palestinian government, 
Israel will use human rights law as the primary basis for administering the territories it 
has control over, while complementarily incorporating the previously discussed necessary 
IHL concepts. This would mean that during the transition period, the Israeli authorities 
(both military and civil) will have to administer the territories without discrimination, and 
with a much higher degree of human rights protections for the Palestinian people, while 
continuously preparing the ground for a fully independent and democratic Palestinian 
government. In this period the Israeli authorities would also be subject to a human rights 
level of scrutiny.  
¶143  In applying this approach to the transition period (as well as prior to that time, 
depending on successful litigation and policy changes), the Palestinian people are likely 
to become more aware, reliant and demanding of human rights, once their own 
government will take full control. The benefit of introducing the Palestinians to a higher 
level of protection of their fundamental rights is that they will consequently not allow 
their own government to deviate from a democratic, rule of law model. In turn, the 
Palestinian government will be forced to maintain the level of protection of the citizens of 
Palestine. In this optimistic scenario, Palestine could become the most progressive and 
human rights-oriented state in the Arab world, leading the way for further reforms in 
other countries.   
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¶144  Finally, in further developing these ideas, there are many more questions that ought 
to be examined. These include, for example, the effects of the U.N. General Assembly 
recognizing Palestine as a non-member state287 on the possibility of Palestine acceding to 
the Geneva Conventions, thus possibly changing Israel’s ability to claim the territories 
have no sovereign. A more inclusive and in-depth analysis of how the human rights 
approach would affect the different aspects of the occupation, and whether this approach 
could be applicable to other situations in the world would also be beneficial in 
strengthening its legitimacy as a development in international law. Another inquiry to be 
considered is developing a detailed set of guidelines for applying IHL and human rights 
law harmoniously, including precise provisions, interpretations, and a hierarchy between 
the two frameworks in particular situations.288  
¶145  In any case, there is no doubt that academic papers are just one avenue of many by 
which those invested in the Middle East attempt to find creative solutions to end the 
conflict. All of these roads should be taken. 
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